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I. Introduction
If the history of Canadian legal education should ever be written,
these years of the mid-1970s will surely be viewed as a period of
critical significance.
For at least a quarter-century, growth has been the predominant
theme: growth in student numbers and faculty complements; growth
in democratic decision-making by both faculty and students, but
also - inevitably - in the bureaucratic structures of faculties;
growth of physical facilities and indeed, of whole new faculties;
growth of libraries and of the pace and variety of research; growth
of curricula and of teaching methods; growth in professional esteem
and in public contribution; and - I believe - growth in quality
throughout the entire system of legal education.
But now, suddenly, ominously, growth ceases. There is no need,
says the bar, for more lawyers in a profession already overcrowded
and confronting legal aid cutbacks, no-fault insurance and no-fault
divorce - all of which will generate more competition for less
work. There is no money, say the governments, for more books, for
better student: faculty ratios, for more research or expensive clinical
programmes or increased scholarships and bursaries. "The
economy has become the secret police of our desires". (Graffito
seen in London, England, July, 1976)
And these nay-saying voices find echoes within the law schools.
Students are anxious to maximize their job prospects and are
focussing their academic efforts - often quite mistakenly - on
courses which they believe will attract potential employers. Faculty
members are perhaps less willing to dream of greatness for their
institution and themselves, more willing to redefine their roles as
potential participants in, not to say servants of, the status quo.
*H. W. Arthurs, Dean and Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University
This article is the text of the second Horace E. Read Memorial Lecture delivered at
the Dalhousie Law School, October 27, 1976.
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Let me not overstate my case: I am speaking only of changes at
the margins. Even in the "golden age" of the 'sixties and early
'seventies not every teacher was a visionary, not every student a
servant of justice, not every school a pedagogic paradise. Nor are
our present law faculties peopled entirely by drones and
self-seekers. I am speaking rather of subtle changes in the
archetypal figures, and above all, in the mood of Canadian legal
education. I am speaking of a situation which is sufficiently fluid,
sufficiently amorphous, that its ultimate shape is as yet unclear.
Indeed, the premise of these remarks is a simple one: if we know
where we have been and where we are, we will be better able to
decide where we wish to go and how to get there. I believe that the
validity of this premise can best be tested by applying it to a series
of specific, but ultimately interconnected, paradoxes which seem to
require resolution if we are to move Canadian legal education
ahead. Let me set out some of these paradoxes, and then try to
resolve them.
First, who attends law school? Although we have tried to assure
that students enter law school on the basis of merit alone, it is
probably much harder than it used to be for members of
disadvantaged groups to gain admission. Although we have become
increasingly sensitive to the need to democratize the profession by
changing its recruitment patterns, we may well be about to witness
even greater social stratification within its ranks.
Second, what do people learn in law school? Although we have
introduced an almost infinite variety of courses and seminars, with
great diversity of teaching methods, we have somehow failed to
alter fundamentally the intellectual and social perceptions of most
students, to stimulate them to take the chances offered them, to
accept the risks of the unfamiliar in exchange for the possibility of
both personal development and a different sort of professional
future.
Third, how well do people perform? In the past fifteen years,
admission standards have risen beyond any reasonable expectation.
No one enters law school today who cannot cope with the work, and
many present most impressive prelaw credentials upon admission.
Yet we cannot honestly claim that the law school is the home of
excellence, or that the reach of every student exceeds his or her
grasp.
Fourth, what is the quantity, quality and direction of legal
scholarship today? There are ten or twenty times as many law
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teachers now as there were in 1950. But is there ten or twenty times
as much scholarly writing? Is it appreciably better? We accept that
the social sciences can do much to inform and invigorate our
analysis of the legal system - a commonplace today, but a heresy
in 1950. But is this perception widely translated into practice by
legal scholars?
Finally, what is the role of the law school within the Canadian
legal system? There can be few countries in which professional law
teachers have contemporaneously occupied the positions of Prime
Minister, Minister of Justice and Chief Justice, to say nothing of the
other judicial posts, chairmen and members of law reform
commissions, labour relations boards, securities commissions,
professional governing bodies, legal aid commissions, royal
commissions, and deputy ministerial posts. But has there been a
contribution, a distinctive intellectual contribution, commensurate
with the great recognition for legal education implicit in these
appointments? And how is it that law teaching nonetheless remains
a precarious and transitory profession which must still struggle to
attract the best prospects and to persuade them to make scholarship
their life's work?
II. Two General Observations
Having posed some difficult problems, and promised solutions, let
me digress only to make two general observations.
So far as the problems are concerned, I freely concede that I have
identified those which seem most pressing from my own particular
perspective. We have little, if any, objective information about
Canadian legal education - or the legal profession itself- beyond
some basic numbers: how many students, faculty members, books
or lawyers in a given province. And even these basic numbers are of
questionable accuracy and of very recent vintage, so that it is
difficult to make comparisons across time or space, with our own
recent past or amongst law schools. Thus, my whole thesis lacks the
factual foundation which it ought to have.
So far as the solutions are concerned, it will be even more
obvious that I am speculating and advocating, rather than reporting
certainties. To a large extent, what can be accomplished depends on
the resources available: how many dollars, which men and women,
in what kind of environment? These resources are largely
determined by forces over which we have no control. Thus we shall
have to work pretty much with what we are given, and my
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"solutions" really amount to no more than an attitude, and
approach, to the use of available resources.
Now to specifics.
III. Access to Legal Education
I have suggested that who attends law school is a question of great
importance. Entry into the legal profession via law school is now,
and for the foreseeable future, a considerable privilege. Equal
access to that privilege for everyone of equivalent ability, regardless
of sex, race, or economic status, must be a democratic objective of
importance to both the legal profession and the general community.
However, it is an objective of special importance to groups which
have been badly underrepresented in the past - women, native
persons, recently-arrived ethnic groups, and the working class
generally. So long as these groups are absent from the profession,
qualified individuals will be denied the privilege I have mentioned.
But, as well, the groups themselves will not have equal access to
the legal services they require. They may have difficulty in relating
to the lawyers who serve them because of. linguistic and cultural
barriers, and they may not be able to muster legal resources in aid of
matters of special concern to them. There has been, at least until
recently, a singular lack of attention paid by lawyers to the legal
problems of women, to native land claims, to immigration law and
to social legislation.
This situation has recently begun to change. Women, not yet
equally represented in the law schools, have increased by a factor of
five or ten in the last five or ten years. Native persons, assisted by
initiatives of the federal Department of Justice, the Native Law
"headstart" programme of the University of Saskatchewan, and by
efforts of other governments and universities, are now entering law
school in perceptible, if not acceptable, numbers.
It is the other two groups which present the greatest difficulties.
Those who come from homes where English (or French) is not a
first language, where reading and articulate speech are not family
habits, or where finances are not available to permit children to
study rather than work - such individuals are effectively excluded
from law school. Few of them get to university, few of them do well
there, and few of them perform well on law school admissions tests
which evaluate literacy and writing ability. And of those very few
who do all these things, only a minor fraction can afford the lengthy
and costly process of legal education.
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The law schools are generally well aware of the problem and have
struggled to meet it. Many law schools now accept mature students
on the basis of ability demonstrated at work or in community
service, rather than in university studies; some law schools have
been able to provide modest - though seldom adequate bursaries and loans; a few even offer special tutorial assistance to
help these individuals adjust to legal studies.
But I am afraid the mountain has laboured to bring forth a mouse.
I do not detect any fundamental change in the recruitment patterns
of Canadian law schools. On the contrary, I have the impression
that even the modest gains of the past few years are in danger. On
the one hand, as admission standards continue to rise across the
country, access for those who are at a competitive disadvantage
becomes more difficult. On the other hand, as studies show,
graduates whose socio-economic status is not high, especially if
their academic record is not superior, are consigned to less
prestigious and less rewarding work within the profession. If, as we
predict, competition within the profession will increase with
increasing numbers, this process of professional stratification will
be enhanced. Thus, over the next few years, attempts to persuade
members of disadvantaged groups to take a chance on legal
education may be undermined by bleak prospects for ultimate
success in practice.
What is to be done?
Obviously, to the extent that the fate of law students from
disadvantaged groups is a function of general social and economic
conditions, there is little the law schools can do. If there is no
money for grants or loans, if there are too few jobs in a crowded
profession, the law schools cannot ease the financial burdens to any
great extent.
But at least one practical measure may be within our grasp.
Should we not reconsider the possibility of permitting some
individuals to work their way through law school, and to attend
classes on a part-time basis? I do not advocate, let me stress, a
general return to the system which prevailed historically in Canada,
whereby legal education was essentially that of apprenticeship, with
a small, barely-tolerated academic component. Nor do I advocate
that we imitate the high-enrolment, low-quality urban night schools
once popular in the United States. I do suggest, however, that it
ought to be possible to obtain in some place in most regions of this
country a legal education comparable in quality to that presently
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offered, but an education which does not require full-time
attendance and hence abandonment by the student of all other
responsibilities.
Working people, women with child care obligations, perhaps
individuals in public life, could be carefully selected for such a
programme. They obviously would require the intellectual ability
expected of students generally, but would also be selected on the
basis that they could survive this rigorous programme, and
ultimately would make some contribution to the community.
On the part of the law school, what would be required would be a
redeployment of faculty and modest amounts of ingenuity. Would it
not be possible, for example, to run one section of first year in the
evenings? If there are too few part-time students to make this
worthwhile, perhaps some full-time students would prefer to attend
evening classes? Would it not be possible similarly to schedule
some reasonably esoteric courses and seminars for similar mixed
participation, or even to develop a specialized curriculum which
would be of interest to this special student constituency? I have in
mind, for example, courses in such subjects as Company Law and
Taxation which focus on the problems of individuals and small
businesses, rather than the more usual preoccupation with the affairs
of large public companies.
Nor is this the only conceivable model of part-time legal
education. It is possible, for example, that a law school located in a
large government centre might develop a programme of part-time
study specifically directed in both form and content to members of
the public service. Or a law school in a large metropolis might be
able to develop a work-study scheme in which periods of formal
full-time education are interspersed with relevant work experience.
The point is, surely, that our present single model for obtaining a
legal education excludes many who are well-qualified and
deserving. If we put our minds directly to this problem, we should
be able to devise a system of part-time education which meets the
needs of these individuals, without compromising our professional
standards.
IV. What Do PeopleLearn at Law School?
In assessing what people learn at law school, it is important to
distinguish this from what they study. In this distinction, perhaps,
lies a partial explanation of the apparent survival of the traditional
orientation of law students in the face of a changing curriculum.
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To begin with the issue of the curriculum, the first year courses in
Canadian law schools, with but a few exceptions, have remained
largely unchanged since the dawn of time. And despite the virtually
total optionalization of second and third years, most students study
most courses which used to be compulsory. Except for the addition
of some specialized and advanced seminars, the transcript of the
average student graduating in 1976 would not look radically
different from that of 1956 or even 1926.
But even for the average student, course titles do not tell the
whole story. To say that a student "learns" Contracts or Company
Law, Torts or Taxation fs to conceal rather than to reveal. In 1956,
for example - I speak with some authority on this point - a
student of Torts, learned about negligence and little else.
Negligence, to be sure, was not only an end in itself, but as well a
vehicle for developing analytical skills through case briefing and
classroom discussion. And, in the best Torts classes of 1956, one
even acquired the impression that individual judgments, and
perhaps the whole tort system, were not beyond criticism. I doubt
that my description of Torts in 1956 would entirely misdescribe
Torts in 1976 - but I know that in some classes, at least, the
emphasis has shifted. I suspect that the rules of negligence law
continue to dominate as a topic of discussion, but that now they
much more clearly serve other purposes. Much greater attention is
likely paid to case analysis as a skill; much greater stress is laid on
the limits of common law litigation as a system of loss distribution,
on the intellectual viability of concepts such as "fault" and
"deterrence", on insurance, legislation, and state compensation
schemes.
The emphasis in learning in first year has thus shifted somewhat
from rules to skills, from the case to the system, from litigation to
legal process. Thus, without any change in the outward appearance
of the curriculum - "Torts" remains "Torts" - the student's
learning experience is substantially altered.
But in fairness, I must also confess that the converse of this
phenomenon may also be true. The apparent proliferation of courses
and seminars does not necessarily signal a new range of learning
experiences. In some cases, these courses or seminars are decorated
with attractive titles - at a minimum they bear the prefix
"Advanced" or the Roman numerals II or III - but they are merely
a more intensive or extensive exploration of themes which could
have been covered in the basic course if it had not been shortened to
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make use of the hours in order to create time for new options. Nor is
this necessarily a bad thing; these themes may not be of general
interest, and it ought to be possible to acquire a basic knowledge of
a subject without becoming immersed in them. However, that a
student will learn more than mere rules is not inevitable. His
intellectual horizons are not necessarily broadened because his
choice of options is doubled or trebled.
If we can concede, then, that the curriculum will not tell us what
students learn in law school, where else can we look?
Here we encounter some problems of evidence. It ought to be
possible to examine syllabi rather closely to determine what is being
taught and to assume that this is also what is being learned.
Sometimes this will undoubtedly be true. New teaching approaches
designed specifically to transmit skills, attitudes or knowledge often
deliver what they have promised. Clinical training programmes are
a good example of this: students develop skills of interviewing,
counselling, negotiating and advocacy, attitudes of professional
responsibility, and substantive knowledge in areas such as landlord
and tenant, immigration, and welfare law - all of which were
denied to their predecessors ten or twenty years ago. And new
approaches to conventional courses may likewise offer new learning
experiences, as I have tried to demonstrate in relation to Torts.
On the other hand, what is promised is not always delivered,
what is delivered is not always accepted, and what is accepted is not
always retained as part of a student's professional, intellectual
equipment.
As to the gap between promise and delivery, it must be frankly
stated that the difference between course descriptions and classroom
performance amounts occasionally to "more than a mere puff".
There are particular risks in relation to interdisciplinary materials in
this regard, albeit for reasons which are easily understandable. A
course which promises (as most do) the understanding of an area of
law from a socio-economic perspective has set its sights high, and
properly so. The role of the family, the labour union, the business
corporation must be understood in social or political or economic
terms if the relevant legal rules are to be understood and evaluated
critically. But consider the obstacles to understanding at that level.
The instructor must educate himself, often in an area where he lacks
either a background or the assurance of continued involvement in
the future. He must then locate materials suitable for inclusion in his
course and edit them for use by students whose knowledge of the
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particular subject may range from graduate-level sophistication to
total ignorance. And finally, he must persuade students that these
materials are not only intellectually stimulating, but within their
grasp, and ultimately worthy of their attention. Small wonder, then,
that so much of what is promised as an interdisciplinary perspective
actually is delivered in hurried, embarrassed or defiant ex cathedra
pronouncements about "social policy", vague allusions to the
infinite complexity and mystery of the subject matter, or humorous
anecdotes and insider information about recent cases or legislative
developments.
But despite these difficulties of delivery, and they are serious,
real problems with the educational equation exist on the "demand"
side as well as the "supply" side. Students always could learn what
they wished to learn, and now may study what they wish to study. If
the curriculum they define for themselves excludes the unconventional, if they edit out themes of intellectual significance and cling
to those which are perceived to be negotiable professionally, no
mere faculty manifesto, not even the deep and passionate conviction
of professors or deans, will alter substantially the intellectual
environment.
One cannot escape the conclusion that students are a significant
conservative force in legal education. For many years, this fact was
obscured by the convenient presence of restrictive regulations
imposed by the legal profession itself. So long as the profession
defined or dictated the structure of curricula and courses, no issue
arose between faculty and students. But when those, external
constraints were removed, a new underlying reality began to
emerge. At first blush, it seemed, during the 1960s and early
'seventies, that, in debates between faculty and students over the
future of legal education, the students' position was the more liberal
one. But hindsight shows us that the students were concerned about
process and not about substance. They were preoccupied with who
would make the decisions and how and within what range of
possibilities, rather than with the actual content of what would be
learned in law school.
Personally, I have always believed - and continue to believe that students should have a significant role in the governance of the
law school, that they should have a range of learning possibilities
open to them, and that as consumers their judgment ought to be
accorded substantial deference. But I cannot say honestly that I
think that this judgment has always been exercised wisely.
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For many students, the most significant single factor in the
selection of a programme of study is whether or not the courses
chosen will advance their professional careers.
Even if one were to concede that man does live by bread alone, it
seems to me that this basis of choice is often counter-productive.
And so it is bound to be: no one, least of all law students, knows
very much about what is actually done in the practice of law. How
many lawyers, for example, spend how much time in drafting wills
and administering estates? How central is litigation to the practice of
most lawyers, and precisely what skills and substantive knowledge
does it require? How often does a lawyer become involved in the
administrative process, what is his role, and what relationship does
it bear to courses on Administrative Law? In the absence of any
reliable information, a considerable presumption is made in favour
of what has always been done. If senior members of the profession
studied Wills, Real Estate and Administrative Law, then their
aspiring successors will do likewise. Never mind that their
education may have been entirely irrelevant to their practice, never
mind that the frontiers of lawyering remain to be discovered, never
mind that the greatest competition will exist amongst the mass of
graduates conventionally equipped for conventional career options
- never mind all that; stick to the straight and narrow. In terms of
simple self-interest, it strikes me that many law students select
precisely the wrong kind of programmes.
But I have defined self-interest narrowly, equating it with
professional advancement. There are other kinds of self-interest
which are no less important. I refer specifically to personal growth
and development which builds upon a foundation laid in the years
before law school, and which infuses a life lived beyond the
boundaries of the law, in the family, the community, and the house
of intellect. So many law students seem singularly indifferent to the
fact that at the end of their education they will be human beings still.
Why, therefore, they should abandon earlier interests in history or
philosphy, sociology or economics, it is difficult to understand.
Why they should retreat from speculation and experimentation is
puzzling. And I do not even stoop to the assertion that these
apparently "non-professional" interests may in fact contribute
greatly to professional possibilities and satisfactions.
However, while my comments (I believe) accurately describe
the majority of law students, there has at least emerged a vital
minority whose perceptions and values are quite different. These
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students do take pleasure in learning the law for its own sake, do
want to repeal the traditional limits of study and research, do dare to
define themselves as a new, more humanistic breed of lawyer. Even
if only a few such law students emerge each year in each school, or
even some years in some schools, we will have made considerable
progress.
And they are emerging: the problem is how to protect such
individuals from peer pressures and professional pressures to
conform to traditional learning patterns.
A minimum feasible answer, lying within the grasp of every law
school, is to encourage these students from the beginning of their
legal studies. At present, we select entering students on the basis of
success they may have achieved in pre-law work as philosophers or
economists or sociologists. But once they enter law school, we
force them to abandon their expertise; we immerse them totally in
caselaw so that they will learn to "think like lawyers". Is it any
wonder that they surface, born again as it were, to repudiate their
former intellectual identities? And is it any wonder that they are
reluctant, in second and third years, to stray from what they now
perceive, what we have defined implicitly, as the straight and
narrow path of professionalism?
We must give these students something more in first year.
Perhaps we should offer them an opportunity to enrol in courses
outside the law school, or interdisciplinary law school options, or
expose them egregiously to broad social and intellectual questions
rather than a steady diet of caselaw; perhaps we should do all of
these things. For if we do not do something, they will never be
given the chance to survive as intellectuals.
However, the law schools cannot afford to mount endless, exotic
upper-year courses in which no one enrols, or to create an artificial
demand for them by restricting enrolment in the more conventional
courses most students prefer to take. Neither tactic represents a
legitimate use of scarce resources.
A more reasonable tactic is for at least a few law schools to offer
programmes which will appeal to special contituencies. One school
might stress its law and economics programme, another its concern
with the environment, a third its links with public administration.
Students attracted to such programmes could apply for admission
either initially or after completing part of their education elsewhere.
Conceding that all law schools must commit themselves primarily to
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preparation for traditional practice roles, it does not follow that none
of them can do anything else in addition.
Nor should students who cannot attend such special programmes
simply be written off. With the investment of only a little extra
faculty time, and the introduction of only a little flexibility in the
administration of academic regulations, many well-motivated
students can be accommodated in individually-designed programmes of reading and research.
V. The Problem of Quality - Students
I come now to a very sensitive topic: quality. Let me say,
immediately, that I have no complaint about quality overall. I
believe that most of our students perform reasonably well, and that
the overall average is considerably better than it has ever been. But
this is precisely what one would expect given the fact that it is
probably easier for a camel to pass through the eye of the needle
than for an applicant to enter a Canadian law school. What I want to
confront, however, is the paradox that so much talent produces so
little first class work.
The paradox is, of course, easily resolved by redefining what we
mean by first class work. Perhaps we see so little of it because we
set unrealistic standards which are unlikely ever to be attained, and
award ordinary grades to work which actually is first class. Or
perhaps law students are not really very able after all. The apparent
excellence of our entering students may be an illusion created by the
inflation of grades in the undergraduate faculties. Or, to borrow a
metaphor from Canadian literature, perhaps our students are merely
"survivors" whose struggles with an essentially inhospitable
environment leave little time for polishing a thin and pretentious
veneer of academic achievement. Any of these explanations would
help to resolve the paradox.
But I believe there is a more fundamental issue. The greatest
enemy of excellence in Canadian legal education is the lack of a
Canadian tradition of excellence. We have had, it is true, some very
fine law teachers and judges and practitioners. But their
accomplishments were individual, not collective. We cannot speak
accurately of a "Canadian school" of jurisprudence, of a
"Canadian tradition" of scholarship in particular areas, of a
"Canadian contribution" to the development of legal education.
Of course, there are exceptions. The Supreme Court of Canada in
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the 1950s was - as our courts go - a liberal institution. But the
"Rand Court" of the 1950s was not really the equivalent of the
American "Warren Court" of the 1960s. Its performance,
remarkable in a Canadian context, was much more evident after the
fact than it was at the time; it attracted little public interest, and
rather modest scholarly support. Its writ expired with the tenure of
its members. A change in its personnel was marked not by a
struggle between old and new philosophies but by the disappearance
of one and the emergence of another. The picture is very different
from that of the post-Warren era in the United States.
Nor have very many of our law teachers or lawyers - again with
a few honourable exceptions - left more than memories behind
them. The Dalhousie Law School in the Weldon era, Toronto in the
1950s and Osgoode in the late 1960s each stood for something; each
had an ethos, a character, which was greater than the sum of the
individual contributions of its faculty and students. But we have
experienced nothing like a Harvard or Yale or Columbia or Chicago
whose law schools have for decades symbolized a distinctive
approach to law and to law teaching, and a standard of faculty and
student performance which excited rivalry and imitation as well as
frequent self-criticism and occasional smugness.
Few treatises were ever written by Canadians, and fewer yet of
these can be said to have been influential in the development of
Canadian law. Indeed, even the business of collecting basic legal
documents - cases and statutes - has been conducted in such a
fitful, derivative and desultory fashion that access to them is
virtually unattainable.
All this is meant not so much as an indictment as a plea in
mitigation of sentence. We are not excellent because we are not
building upon solid foundations. Every time we address a problem,
we must do so as if for the first time. No matter that a brilliant
professor or advocate may have rationalized a line of cases in class
or in court; his theory served the purposes of the moment but was
not preserved for posterity. No matter that a brilliant judge devised a
new approach to the reading of our constitution or a modem
application of an ancient property doctrine; his judgment probably
passed without academic comment or controversy, was miscatalogued crudely in some digest, and is now conveniently ignored
by his successors who would prefer to respond to the same question
in a different fashion without the awkward necessity of making fine
distinctions.
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In sum, because we have not built upon our past, we cannot hone
our skills on the controversies of the present, and will not properly
define the path of the future. Little wonder, then that even many
leading judges and practitioners and good students are often content
to answer questions in modest and expedient terms rather than
setting them in the context of a theory, that their "research"
encompasses the obvious, but seldom reaches beyond, that
compilation and amicable reconciliation of every case, rather than
critical juxtaposition, is the order of the day.
If there is any merit in my analysis, it will be clear that there is no
easy road to excellence. We cannot rewrite the past, recapture lost
opportunities, invent a tradition. But neither can we accept the
permanent tyranny of "good enough".
What is needed in Canada is the development of structures which
legitimate and encourage excellence. In the United States, the great
national law schools perform this role by recruiting students of
astonishing talents from across the country, and by exposing them
to elite faculties. Graduates of these schools are accepted almost
automatically into leading law firms, coveted judicial clerkships and
key government positions. The very fact that an individual was
admitted to, and performed successfully at, one of these schools is a
sufficient credential.
In this country, we have a much smaller student constituency to
draw upon, and constitutional, economic and professional pressures
tend to give legal education a provincial focus. We are therefore
unlikely to develop national centres of excellence as the Americans
have done. The relatively small number of potential legal
intellectuals is likely to be dispersed amongst all the law schools.
It is therefore particularly important that each law school should
develop a strategy for the encouragement of its best students. In the
larger or wealthier law schools, this strategy may include some
special courses offering extra challenges and rewards for highlymotivated individuals. In smaller law schools, the best strategy may
be to take advantage of the greater personal contact to offer
outstanding students individually-designed study projects. In some
law schools, serious cultivation of specialized post-graduate studies
may be the most effective contribution to the advancement of
excellence. But whatever the strategy, its objective is the same: to
give the best of our students an opportunity for intellectual growth
and self-fulfilment.
So much for the students. What of the professoriate?
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VI. The Problem of Quality -Professors
On a similar occasion, some years ago, I advanced the proposition
that Canadian lawyers and legal educators have passed through
several "levels of consciousness" within a remarkably short period
of time. The first advance upon the traditional view of law as a
series of individual mysteries, rules and procedures was a concern
for taxonomy, the organization and rational arrangement of
knowledge. This movement had hardly reached adolescence, let
alone maturity, before we became preoccupied with questions of
ideology and methodology, with the perception that law is shaped
by, and helps to shape, social forces, and is not the "brooding
omnipresence" which the earlier rule orientation had implied. And,
most recently, we have experienced a passionate and outspoken
concern for empathy, for the relationship between lawyers and
clients at a human level, which in its turn views as arid and
oppressive the earlier intellectual movements. These very different
views of law, I suggested, have followed so closely upon each other
that none of them reached full flower. On the contrary, their
virtually simultaneous emergence - over a period of twenty or
thirty years - has created tensions and ambiguities within the
scholarly community which have proven very difficult to resolve.
Let me illustrate. A considerable debate has been waged in recent
years about several aspects of the law of rape. This debate had its
origins in the humane concern, properly emphasised, for the impact
of existing legal procedures upon rape victims. This concern was
translated into ideological terms by the women's movement which
sought to bring about changes in the law in this area. These efforts,
however, evoked opposition from the defence bar which was
alarmed about the possible unfairness of changes to accused
persons.
A serious legal scholar who wished to make a contribution to this
debate would find a dearth of either doctrinal writing or empirical
investigation on this important subject. He or she would thereupon
confront a dilemma. Should research on caselaw and legislation be
given first priority? While this seems like a sensible place to begin,
if legal rules are to be changed, the exercise smacks of irrelevance:
what is analyzed so painstakingly today may all be otherwise
tomorrow. Alternately, should empirical research be awarded first
priority? Here again there is a dilemma: in the absence of clearly
defined objectives, it is difficult to evaluate either current practices
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or proposed changes. Thus, there is a great temptation to place
small offerings on the altars of both doctrine and experience and to
move rapidly towards the task of reform unencumbered by adequate
information about either life or law. Nor, I stress, is it really
possible to do otherwise. No researcher could perform both of these
tasks within a reasonable time. The problem is that there is no well
of scholarship into which a researcher can dip, no mentor at whose
feet one may learn, no contemporary with whom one can clash or
collaborate. In short, in most fields, it is not just the future which
begins today, but also the past.
Let me now make explicit what was implicit in this analysis.
Canadian legal scholarship, in all of its manifestations, is often
inadequate, sometimes acceptable, but seldom - on an objective
scale - first class. In other words, if we were to apply the grading
profile of student marks to an assessment of faculty members, the
results would be pretty much the same.
Nor is this mere coincidence. Each situation helps to perpetuate
the other. So long as professors do not demonstrate excellence, they
will not evoke imitation amongst their students. So long as students
are content with "good" rather than "best", they will not challenge
and inspire their teachers to higher levels of achievement.
I believe that it is possible to devise a realistic strategy for
excellence in Canadian legal education. The first component of such
a strategy is already in place at virtually every Canadian law school.
It involves encouragement and recognition of scholarly achievement. This takes several forms. First of all, it is important that
hiring, promotion and tenure decisions give adequate weight to
scholarly attainment. Second, there must be a sense of freedom, a
sense that no "received truth", no preeminent authority, has the
right to inhibit new lines of argument and inquiry. And third, there
must be adequate facilities and resources. All of these conditions
exist throughout Canadian legal education.
However, I believe that several important components of a
formula for excellence are found seldom, if ever, in our law
schools.
Foremost amongst these missing components I would rank a
sense of intellectual community. I use this term in several senses. I
mean to convey that there must be a "critical mass" of individuals
who are committed to high standards in general and to specific areas
of intellectual inquiry in particular, so that they can provoke,
stimulate and encourage each other, whether through cooperative or
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competitive relationships. I do not mean for a moment to suggest
that books are to be written by committees or that excellence is to be
achieved by conferences. I mean to say, rather, that we should be
able to deliver our best to the judgment of our peers, and that
intellectual jury duty should be the civic obligation of every law
teacher.
A further missing component is a refined sense of time and space.
Too much of Canadian legal scholarship is committed to
controversies of the moment, to law review articles whose
cultivation is geared to the seasons of the academic year, to
commissioned studies written against deadlines. Too little of our
effort is invested in the exploration of great themes which may
consume years of effort rather than months, an entire career rather
than a summer vacation period.
Again, I understand the reasons. We want to have an impact on
events, we want our work to be useful, and we want to receive from
shortrun results the gratification which is largely denied those who
submit to the judgment of posterity. Moreover, most legal scholars
are too young, too inexperienced, too busy mastering the basics of
teaching and research, to attempt anything more substantial. And,
after all, why should we? Law and society are changing rapidly. A
treatise on the law of taxation or labour relations or environmental
law must be published in loose-leaf form or condemned to instant
obsolescence. To embark upon the writing of a traditional legal
book is a task which is either Sisyphean or just plain silly.
Yet this is precisely what we must do. If we do not, we will be the
prisoners of intellectual structures borrowed from the United States
or England or France, or cobbled together in Canada in times past.
Happily, there is a remarkably encouraging trend towards the
publication of major works by a new generation of Canadian legal
scholars. Whether these works are of the first quality or not remains
to be seen; at least they represent a formidable beginning, and they
will stimulate the aspirations of succeeding generations.
Writing books takes time, and time is hard to come by in law
schools where teaching loads are reasonably heavy, where
accessibility to students is emphasized, where the demands of
committee work and administration are never-ending. To be sure,
sabbatical leaves often provide time for reflection and research, but
even more time is needed. We must arrange to give some relief from
other commitments to individuals who embark upon major works of
scholarship.
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Socio-legal research, as opposed to conventional scholarship,
presents special problems. A serious empirical study can seldom be
undertaken in a few weeks or months; it is almost bound to stretch
over a period of years. But it is preparation for the task which is or ought to be - most time-consuming. Relatively few law teachers
come to empirical research with developed skills. Although
committed as a matter of principle to the proposition that the social
sciences can tell us much about law, they are faced with a dilemma
in attempting to put this principle into practice. If they seek
assistance from a social scientist, they are at the mercy of the
priorities and abilities of their collaborator. On the other hand, if
they seek to undertake the task alone, they must first educate
themselves in social science methodology to a reasonably
sophisticated level before embarking upon substantive work. But
this process of education is lengthy and problematic. At the end of
it, the legal scholar may still not know enough, or the impetus for
the research project may have disappeared. And, moreover, the
investment of so much time is likely to pay only limited dividends in
terms of feedback in courses and seminars. Thus, it will be a rare
and determined individual who perseveres and equips himself to
undertake serious interdisciplinary research.
Yet this problem of time does not fully explain our limited
success in socio-legal research. Why have we failed to do what we
know we ought to do in this area?
Perhaps one explanation for our failure is that legal academics are
still struggling to legitimate their position within the legal
profession. To do this, we must continually demonstrate our
proficiency in the conventional arts of lawyering. This exercise
consumes not just time but energy, and rewards skills other than
those involved in socio-legal research. And we must also be careful
not to offend the intellectual taboos which the profession respects.
Insights gained through interdisciplinary research may well collide
with such well-accepted legal "truths" as the pre-eminent value of
adjudication as a method of resolving conflict or of "reasonableness" as a workable test of conduct. Thus to embark upon such
research is not only to turn one's back upon more acceptable tasks,
but as well to risk unpleasant confrontation with some basic beliefs
and values of the profession.
Much significant legal research has been commissioned by law
reform bodies or other public agencies. Their sponsorship has many
attractions: it provides funds, time away from other duties, access to
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data and expert assistance, respectability, and the incentive of
practical 4plication. These bodies have done much for the cause of
research in Canada. But commissioned research is not the ultimate
answer to this country's deficit of socio-legal scholarship.
Even assuming that commissioned research can be fundamental
and comprehensive, rather than merely task-orientated and trivial,
that it is ultimately put into the public domain rather than locked up
in secret files, the fact remains that it is commissioned. This fact
constrains the researcher. He knows he is pursuing someone else's
priorities, not his own. He knows that he has been paid for his work,
and that he owes his patron a certain degree of loyalty and immunity
from criticism. And he knows that the ultimate measure of his work
will be its acceptability rather than its scholarly worth.
I would therefore argue that socio-legal researchers should not be
utterly dependant on such patronage. In order to preserve the
freedom to select their own priorities, to speak with complete
independence, to set their own scholarly standards, these
researchers need other options. Let me suggest some.
First, because I believe that individual skills and motivation are
the sine qua non of any successful effort, it is essential that
individual faculty members be given leave for purposes of
intellectual retooling. Second, funds must be made available from
non-governmental sources to support their work. Third, socio-legal
research should be given a symbolic focus by the establishment of
one or more centres to which researchers could be seconded for
periods of time. Hopefully, such centres would maintain a small
permanent staff of social science consultants, and sponsor a journal
and other publications. But most of all they would provide a forum
for intellectual interchange and mutual moral support. And finally,
the law schools should establish a demilitarized zone within their
curricula for students and faculty members who wish to study and
pursue serious research using interdisciplinary insights. This zone
cannot be justified "economically" in the sense that faculty
teaching loads will approximate those generally prevailing, or that
students will be able to barter their credentials for better articling
jobs. But it will be an invaluable investment in the exploration of
the real problems of law in Canadian society.
In the fullness of time, perhaps, socio-legal work by law students
and professors will come to be seen by even relatively conservative
lawyers as a legitimate professional activity. They will come to
understand that many lawyers work for or against bureaucracies, for
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example, and that they will be more effective if they have some
knowledge of organization theory. They will come to concede that
the quality of the daily, routine advice given by lawyers to
businessmen is enhanced if they understand economics and politics
as well as law. And some, in these days of a crowded legal
profession, will even embrace new career possibilities which are
open to those whose knowledge is derived from sources more exotic
than the Rules of Practice or the law reports. When this happens the
armistice between "real" lawyers and the hybrid socio-legal
species will become a treaty of friendship and cooperation. And this
pious hope brings me to the conclusion of my paper.
VII. Conclusion
Despite the qualms and qualifications I have expressed, I do believe
that Canadian legal education has achieved much in the last ten or
twenty years. Law teachers have scaled the loftiest heights of power
and prestige, broken new ground through research and writing, and
launched their students on conventional and unconventional careers
equipped to an unprecedented degree with professional skills and
social commitment. But still this ultimate, this devilish, paradox:
despite its successes, and perhaps because of them, Canadian legal
education remains a fragile, almost ephemeral, enterprise.
I want, first of all, to address the components of its success, then
to attempt to analyze its weaknesses, and finally to say a word about
the future of legal education.
To the extent that success is symbolized by penetration of various
professional elites, it is not difficult to understand how and why the
law schools succeeded. Law teachers were obvious candidates for
many prestigious posts because of their professionalism, not their
intellectualism or radicalism. They have made their way more as
technocrats than as ideologues. No doubt many, perhaps most, of
the law teachers who have moved on to judicial or public service
careers represented a liberalizing influence in their new settings, but
this says more about the institutions which they joined than about
their own philosophical stance.
From this perspective, the greatest risk to continued success is
that legal education will be outflanked. On one side, well-trained
young lawyers, often from the more sophisticated metropolitan law
firms, can now compete with law teachers in sheer technical ability.
On the other, the failure of legal scholars to develop new,
fundamental theoretical perspectives on "the system", leaves them
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vulnerable to intellectual competition from other groups, both inside
and outside academe. But, truth to tell, if the job can be done better
by people from other backgrounds, so it should be. What is much
more troubling than the precarious prestige of law teachers is the
potential for serious deterioration within the law schools.
Whatever else may be said of Canadian law schools, over the last
quarter-century, they have at least raised the intellectual level of the
legal profession. But this praiseworthy achievement may be in
danger. In a sense, many of our best and brightest find themselves
all dressed up with no place to go. Although necessary for service to
clients, much of the practice of law is boring, routine, uninspiring,
unworthy of the attention of the cream of the nation'S youth. What
does the rivetting together of contractual boilerplate offer to a
student who is steeped in consumerism? What does the prosecution
or defence of minor offenders evoke in a student who was a budding
criminologist? Of course, in the early years of a career, it is possible
to regard these less glamorous professional chores as an economic
necessity, as a learning experience, even as-a necessary way-station
on the road to higher-level work. But economic rewards do not feed
the hungry mind, apprenticeship reaches a point of diminishing
returns, and there is not enough higher-level work to occupy all who
are ultimately available to do it.
Then the reaction begins. For some time, this reaction prompts an
instinctive reaching backward for the excitement of law school tentative inquiries about graduate work, full-time or part-time
teaching. For others, the logic of their discontent leads to a
complete change of direction from law to journalism or politics or
business. But for most, change seems an unaffordable luxury. Of
those who perservere, only a minority will find ultimate
professional satisfaction. But many will be brutalized by their
experience and will learn to survive only by regarding their unhappy
lot as the natural and normal career of a lawyer. Within the
framework of their perception, modern legal education must seem
somewhat irresponsible. It would be tragic if these dissillusioned
graduates appeared ultimately as hostile witnesses against the law
schools, and blamed them for their disappointments. Yet this is a
serious possibility.
And finally, one of the great accomplishments of modern legal
education has been to become more "relevant", more intimately
concerned with the real problems of people in our society. This we
were able to do with relative ease at least partly because we were
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participating in a more general development which occurred
virtually everywhere in the world of education. Now, as many of
the influences which helped to shape modem legal education come
under criticism throughout society, we are unlikely to escape
unscathed.
The ideas of progressive education have helped to influence our
views of how and what to teach. Like the primary and secondary
schools, we may soon be pressured to return to "basics", abandon
"frills", impose discipline and teach deportment. The welfare state
and the regulated economy have been regarded as facts of life which
should be mirrored in the content of our courses. As these facts of
life draw greater political fire, the law schools may well be hit on
the ricochet. The principle of equality of opportunity has been a
growing influence in our admissions policies, at least in recent
years. We may well feel the sting of any backlash that develops
against minorities and disadvantaged groups. Legal research,
especially socio-legal research, has often been fueled by the notion
that if we only understood a problem, we could do something about
it. As so many problems daily seem to become intractable, the
motive power of research may dwindle.
In all of these possibilities there is a great deal of irony. If only
we had committed half the sins we will be accused of, we would
have accomplished so much more than we actually did.
Yet it is not external criticism which ultimately poses the most
serious dangers for Canadian legal education. I expect that where
there seems to be merit in such criticism, we will defer to it. Where
it is misinformed or merely malicious, we will probably have the
sense to disregard it. Indeed, external criticism may strengthen the
law schools. It is not unknown for institutions to rise to their finest
hour in responding to external threats.
The greatest danger, the only real danger, to Canadian legal
education is not that it will be attacked too severely by its enemies,
but that it will be too little loved by its friends.
I have several times mentioned the astonishing emergence of law
teachers in prestigious positions throughout the legal and political
system as evidence of our success. But consider what the departure
of each such person from law teaching means to the enterprise. At
the most obvious level, it means that the most outstanding men and
women are no longer available to teach classes, to write books, or to
help to chart the future course of educational developments. The
loss is qualitative, not merely quantitative, and thus particularly

Paradoxes of Canadian Legal Education 661

painful. Perhaps less obvious is the message for the colleagues they
leave behind in the law schools. In effect, their departure implies
that legal education offers them less intellectual scope, less personal
challenge, less opportunity for social contribution than the new
political, judicial, administrative or practice roles they have
accepted in preference to law teaching. This implicit, sometimes
explicit, message does little to enhance morale. Moreover, their
departures legitimate a career pattern which will tend to attract into
law teaching birds of passage whose ultimate destination is
elsewhere. And, finally, a constant turnover of faculty members
disrupts the intellectual and social networks which can do so much
to provide stimulation and sustenance within a faculty.
For all of these reasons, I see the dwindling passion of the
professoriate as the greatest menace faced by Canadian law schools.
I am neither unaware of, nor consoled by, the many good reasons
why law teachers may prefer to be elsewhere. I understand full well
the challenge and the civic obligation of judicial service; I accept
that many have the legitimate desire to test their mettle in the
cut-and-thrust of practice or politics; I concede that teaching can
become repetitive and that if the muse temporarily withholds her
favours, a lifetime of scholarship must present the ultimate torment;
above all, I understand the impluse towards personal change in a
changing society and in the critical mid-career period. And I have
not mentioned fame or money; I do not think that these are
important considerations.
I know, and respect, the validity of all of these (and other)
considerations which have led so many outstanding law teachers to
move on to other careers. Whether they could have been happy in
the long run, I would not presume to predict. But I believe honestly
that the country would have been better off if many of them had
stayed in law teaching. What, apart from the need to reassure
myself, leads me to suggest that legal education is a more deserving
beneficiary of their talents than other private or public careers?
My concern is with marginal utility; the potential impact of one
more good law professor is much greater in the long run than that of
one more good judge, lawyer or politician. Legal education is the
fulcrum of the Canadian legal system. Law schools must train
lawyers to new and higher standards of technical competence and
professional responsibility; they must be a source of intellectual
innovation for the profession; and they must provide the public with
a disinterested and informed evaluation of the legal system. None of
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these important public functions will be performed well if law
schools should become a mere staging ground for the bench, bar or
cabinet. We cannot have both perpetual motion and serious
pretensions to excellence.
In the face of current realities - cutbacks, criticism, and constant
turnover - it is hard to be optimistic. But if only to sustain the
theme of paradox on which this paper began, I do want to conclude
on an optimistic note.
Canadian legal education did not make its great leap forward in
the 1960s because there was more money available, because the
profession removed its heavy hand, because it experienced an influx
of new students and teachers - though all of these helped, to be
sure. What moved our law schools ahead was ultimately the
decision of faculty and students and administrators to seize the
challenge and the opportunity - to improve the profession, the
legal system, the quality of justice, and their own performance.
Current realities have not altered that challenge, although they
may have diminished opportunities to some degree. We now
understand that we cannot do everything, or at least cannot do
everything all at once. But if our task is going to be harder, it is still
immensely worthwhile. And what better basis for optimism is there,
after all, than the existence of a challenge and of good people to
meet it?

